Introduction: Accountable care organizations have the potential to increase the value of health care by improving population health and enhancing financial stewardship. How practice context modifies effects on a specialty focused disease, such as prostate cancer care, has implications for their success.
Although prostate cancer is a common disease, it remains one of the most difficult to manage. Uncertainty about who to treat and how has resulted in tremendous variation in prostate cancer care, 1e4 raising serious concerns about unnecessary treatment and spending. 5 The implementation of Medicare Shared Savings Program ACOs encourages a shift in organized medicine toward population based thinking about health and enhanced financial stewardship, both of which have the potential to increase the value of prostate cancer care.
To some extent, the nature and scope of the prostate cancer care delivered are related to the practice context, including how urologists organize themselves. Multispecialty groups, which most closely align with the culture of ACOs, 6 are well positioned to share information and coordinate care across specialties, 7e9 which can eliminate waste and reduce spending. Alternatively, single specialty groups allow for surgeon subspecialization and enhanced integration throughout the prostate cancer care continuum, 10, 11 which may lead to better outcomes and lower costs, 6, 12, 13 particularly in larger groups. 14 However, in both contexts incentives in the fee-for-service delivery system favoring volume based productivity have the potential to offset the advantages inherent to each model. How multispecialty and single specialty practices respond to ACO implementation, particularly for specialty service lines, will invariably impact the ability to achieve the goals of reforms, namely improving the value of health care. Therefore, we performed a study to understand the early implications of ACOs for prostate cancer treatment and spending. In particular, we assessed the extent to which effects varied across single and multispecialty practice models. We hypothesized that ACOs would be associated with lower rates of treatment and reduced spending, and that these effects would be strongest for multispecialty groups. This study provides real-world data on relationships between practice context and policy implementation.
Methods

Study Population
We performed a retrospective cohort study of fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries with newly diagnosed prostate cancer in 2012 and 2013 using a 20% national sample. Incident cases of prostate cancer were identified in claims using an established method that has a specificity and positive predictive value of 99.8% and 88.7%, respectively. 15 We attributed each patient to the practice affiliation of his primary urologist. We first assigned patients to their primary urologist using well established methods. 16 Urologists were assigned to their practice affiliation (single specialty vs multispecialty group) with explicit fields in the Healthcare Relational Services provider files (IMS Health). Those employed by hospitals were classified in multispecialty groups. Because resources (eg ability to invest in health information technology), negotiating leverage and bandwidth for contractual arrangements in a practice typically increase with size, single specialty practices were further stratified into small (ie fewer than 10 urologists) and large (ie 10 or more urologists) groups.
Outcomes
We assessed curative treatment and spending among these newly diagnosed men with prostate cancer for the 12-month period after the diagnosis. Curative treatment was ascertained from the Medicare Provider Analysis and Review, Carrier, and Outpatient files using explicit codes for external beam radiation therapy, surgery, brachytherapy and cryotherapy. We determined spending using price standardized payments to remove differences related to geography and facility characteristics (eg indirect medical education funds, disproportionate share payments) and adjusted all payments for inflation to 2013 U.S. dollars. 17 Spending was characterized by all Medicare payments made from the initial prostate cancer diagnosis date through 1 year after diagnosis. We chose this comprehensive approach, as opposed to limiting it to claims associated with a diagnosis code of 185 for prostate cancer, because it captures claims (eg visits, complications, readmissions) related to the intervention. An analysis limiting payments to claims with a diagnosis code of 185 was performed as a sensitivity analysis and demonstrated findings consistent with the aforementioned comprehensive approach.
Analysis
We compared patient, practice affiliation and regional characteristics according to patient alignment in an ACO using chi-square tests. To examine the independent effect of ACO alignment on the use of curative treatment, we fit a multivariable logistic model using the patient as the unit of analysis. We used the Area Resource File to derive the regional characteristics of the population, including urban residence, Medicare managed care penetration, and the supply of urologists, radiation oncologists and hospital beds. The model was adjusted for patient age, race, socioeconomic class, comorbidity and the aforementioned regional characteristics. Comorbidity was determined with patient claims for the 12-month window before diagnosis using established methods. 18 Socioeconomic class was estimated using a composite measure developed at the 5-digit zip code level, as described by Diez Roux et al. 19 To determine whether the impact of ACOs was modified by practice affiliation (small single specialty group, large single specialty group, multispecialty group), we fit a second model that additionally included a term for each urologist's practice affiliation and an interaction term between affiliation and ACO alignment. We derived adjusted percentages of patients treated across urologist practice affiliations and ACO alignment by backtransforming the predicted use from this second model. We next assessed relationships between ACO alignment and Medicare payments in the year after diagnosis. In this context a generalized linear model was used with a negative binomial distribution and a log link. A second model was then fit accounting for practice affiliation and an associated interaction term for ACO alignment. Both models were adjusted for the covariates previously noted. Adjusted payments were derived for the second model as described. All models used generalized estimating equations to account for the clustering of patients in hospital referral regions.
Sensitivity Analysis
To some extent the relationship between ACOs and prostate cancer treatment and spending may be related to the amount of "skin in the game" of a given practice. In other words, practices with a patient population enriched by ACO beneficiaries may be more apt to align themselves with the value based principles underlying these organizations. Therefore, we assessed relationships between the ACO penetration in a practice's population of prostate cancer and both outcomes.
We limited this sensitivity analysis to single specialty groups because we were able to capture all physicians in each practice. To measure ACO penetration we examined the distribution of groups caring for at least 5 patients with prostate cancer during the study interval and separated them into groups based on proportion of patients in ACOs (none, 12.5% or less, or greater than 12.5% of patients with prostate cancer aligned with ACOs). Modeling was performed using the respective approaches previously outlined for the main analyses. All analyses were performed in SASÒ 9.4. All tests were 2-tailed and the probability of Type 1 error was set at 0.05. The study protocol was judged to be exempt by the institutional review board of the University of Michigan.
Results
We identified 15,640 patients with newly diagnosed prostate cancer in 2012 and 2013. Of these patients 1,100 (7.0%) were aligned with a Shared Savings Program ACO. Characteristics of the patient population by ACO alignment are shown in the table. Patients with prostate cancer in ACOs were similar to those not in ACOs with respect to age, race and comorbidity. Patients in ACOs resided in more affluent neighborhoods compared to those not in ACOs (41% vs 34%, respectively, p <0.001). Similarly, patients in ACOs more commonly resided in urban areas with a greater supply of urologists and radiation oncologists (both p <0.001). Finally, those in ACOs were less likely to be cared for by a small single specialty group compared to patients not in ACOs (45% vs 52%, respectively, p <0.001).
After adjusting for patient and regional characteristics we found no relationship between use of curative treatment and ACO alignment (71.4%, 95% CI 68.6e74.1 in ACOs vs 70.0%, 95% CI 69.1e71.0 not in ACOs, p¼0.33). As illustrated in figure 1 , the absence of an ACO effect was consistent across the 3 practice contexts. In contrast, adjusted spending for the 12-month period after diagnosis was higher in patients with prostate cancer in ACOs compared to those not in ACOs ($20,916; 95% CI $19,969e$21,907 vs $19,773; 95% CI $19,413e$20,139, respectively; p¼0.03). As shown in figure 2, higher adjusted spending among patients in ACOs was consistent across practice affiliations (interaction between ACO alignment and group practice context p¼0.90).
We then assessed the relationship between the extent of involvement of single specialty practices in the ACO program (ie the proportion of their prostate cancer population aligned with ACOs) and treatment and spending. Adjusted rates of treatment were similar for those practices with no ACO patients, those with 12.5% or less, and those with more than 12.5% ( fig. 3, A) . However, adjusted rates of spending for the 12-month period after diagnosis increased with ACO penetration (p¼0.0494; fig. 3 
, B)
Discussion ACOs aim to improve the value of health care delivered by improving quality and reducing spending. 20 Their potential to eliminate unnecessary care would contribute significantly to both of these domains. We found that newly diagnosed patients with prostate cancer in ACOs had rates of treatment similar to those of patients not in ACOs. Furthermore, spending for the 12-month period after diagnosis was significantly higher for patients in ACOs. Our findings of similar treatment and higher spending for prostate cancer among patients in ACOs could be explained by at least 2 structural characteristics embedded in the feefor-service delivery system. Policymakers have long believed there is a link between urologist practice context and the nature and extent of prostate cancer care. 21 However, we found that urologist practice affiliation did not modify the relationship between ACOs and both outcomes. In other words, whether a patient with prostate cancer was treated by a single specialty group or a multispecialty group did little to explain our findings. This is somewhat surprising given that the latter group embodies several characteristics considered synonymous with efficiency. These include a focus on accountability; strong physician leadership; improved physician to physician communication; the presence of systems for coordination of care, performance measurement and quality improvement; and incentives that reward quality.
9,22e26
The second potential structural characteristic that may impact our findings relates to urologist buy in. Because practices invariably care for patients in and out of ACOs, it is highly plausible that groups treating a larger market share of ACO beneficiaries (ie higher ACO penetration) would be more attuned to achieving the aims of ACOs. Specifically, these groups rely more heavily on referrals from primary care physicians aligned with ACOs. At least among patients treated by single specialty groups, increasing ACO penetration was not associated with curative treatment but was associated with higher spending.
That spending for patients in ACOs is higher than for those outside of the program is not surprising. Shared Savings Program ACOs receive financial incentives for, Figure 2 . Relationship between ACO alignment and adjusted spending in 12 months after prostate cancer diagnosis, stratified by practice context. Patients in ACOs had higher adjusted spending than those not in ACOs (p¼0.03) for 12 months after prostate cancer diagnosis. Pattern was similar across 3 group practice contexts (interaction between ACO alignment and practice context p¼0.90).
among other things, reducing per beneficiary spending. 20 Participation by primary care physicians, and by extension their patients, is voluntary, and currently virtually none bear downside financial risk. 27 Our findings are consistent with selection to participate by higher spending physicians and are supported by prior work in this area. 20, 28 As opportunities to share in savings are benchmarked against historical average spending for each ACO, "expensive" group practices invariably joined because they have more room to move in terms of cutting costs (eg by eliminating easy to identify superfluous costs). Our findings should be interpreted in the context of several limitations. Our inference is limited to Medicare beneficiaries with prostate cancer. While it is possible that patterns of treatment and spending might differ for younger patients, our findings are generalizable to the target population for the Shared Savings Program. In addition, and most importantly, we cannot get at the appropriateness of the use of treatment or spending for these patients. Although there is no biological rationale for why prostate cancer disease severity would vary according to ACO alignment, we acknowledge that such information would lend further insight into appropriateness. While other data sets such as SEER (Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results)-Medicare contain such information, sample size constraints preclude inference due to the limited initial diffusion of ACOs in this population. However, that practice affiliation does not modify relationships between ACOs and treatment and spending is informative for anticipating the broader impact of these organizations moving forward, as concerns about their generalizability continue to ebb. 29 This study design also does not imply a causal relationship between ACOs and spending. Rather, our study describes the early patterns of treatment and spending for prostate cancer among the Shared Savings Program ACOs, and demonstrates that more is spent on participants in the program. As previously noted, that early ACOs are selected for higher Medicare spending at baseline is well established. However, spending differences for nonparticipants compared to ACO patients have generally been more modest, suggesting that spillover effects to specialty conditions have not occurred. In addition, our analysis does not consider urologist employment status or distinguish among ACO types (eg independent practice association vs hospital based). There is some evidence to suggest that ACOs independent of hospitals deliver better care at a lower cost. 20 Finally, this study primarily examines cost, only one part of the "value" equation. It is possible that the higher spending by ACOs is made up for by improvements in quality, such as enhanced access, patient centeredness and better cancer specific outcomes.
Conclusion
Newly diagnosed patients with prostate cancer in Shared Savings Program ACOs have similar use of treatment but higher spending in the year after diagnosis. This relationship is not impacted by the practice affiliation of the urologist. Future work should examine the effects of ACOs on prostate cancer care over time as they disseminate across a larger swath of the Medicare population. For some diseases such as prostate cancer ACOs will have to figure out how to engage specialists if they are to be successful at reducing spending. Furthermore, until ACOs are forced to bear more than nominal downside risk, such as through participation in an advanced alternative payment model implied by MACRA (the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act), savings are likely to be modest, if there are any at all. physicians aligned with an ACO between 2012 and 2013. More notably, ACO aligned practices failed to decrease prostate cancer treatment costs or significantly change care. This initial view into the care provided in ACO practices is fascinating and important on several fronts, particularly given the cost containment and value-add objectives of ACOs. Several factors may explain the discordant findings. As noted by the authors, "expensive" practices may have been more willing to participate in ACOs as the cost saving targets and upside rewards may be more achievable for them. Specialties like urology may also be less responsive to the carrots and sticks of Shared Savings programs, or more time may be necessary to see the intended effects of ACO levers. More downbeat, ACOs may not bend the cost curve. 1 
